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Chapter 16

Environmental Effects of U.S. Military Security

Gendered Experiences from the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan

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Militarist policies and ideologies valorize preparations for war, threats of war, and ultimately war itself as the only effective way of providing for state security. The realist paradigm in international relations, dominant in political, military, and academic thinking about national security, assumes "a hostile international environment" in which "sovereign, self-interested states" seek their own security through a balance of political and military power among them (Tickner 2001: 38). On this view, war is always a possibility, and "states must rely on their own power and capabilities rather than international agreements to enhance their national security" (ibid.). Michael Renner underscores this point: military security "relies firmly on the competitive strength of individual countries at the expense of other nations." By contrast, he points out, "environmental security cannot be achieved unilaterally; it both requires and nurtures more stable and cooperative relations among nations" (quoted in Seager 1993a: 60).

A growing literature attests to the fundamental contradiction between military security and environmental security. Examples include catastrophic wartime events like the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, use of the defoliant "Agent Orange" in the Vietnam War, the burning of oil fields and use of depleted uranium in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the bombing of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.[1] Environmental destruction for military ends involves the entire nuclear cycle, from uranium mining through development, testing, and disposal of weapons-grade plutonium, and recirculation of depleted uranium in "conventional" weapons.[2]

Governments, military authorities, and many ordinary people accept the environmental destruction caused by military operations as a necessary evil, one of many forms of collateral damage, ultimately justifiable in terms of national security. According

to Gary Vest, an assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for environmental security, "There is not a [U.S.] military base in the world that doesn't have some soil or ground water contamination. That is just a given" (quoted in Wokusch 2004). Ret. Adm. Eugene Carroll quoted President Dwight Eisenhower as saying, early in the Cold War, "The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without" (People's Task Force 1997: 17).

This contradiction is nowhere more apparent than in the designation "national sacrifice area," a phrase used by the Department of Energy under the Nixon administration to justify the contamination of Native American land used for uranium mining (LaDuke 1999). This racist and arrogant concept prompts many questions. Who decides what becomes a national sacrifice area? Whose land and livelihood are degraded or destroyed? How many national sacrifice areas can there be before sacrificing some essential part of the nation? Pacific island nations have been sacrificed for atomic weapon tests conducted by the United States, Britain, and France and indigenous nations of North America, Australasia, and Hawai'i for uranium mining, bombing training, and waste disposal (Cohn 1993; Women Working 1987; Trask 1999).

This study contributes to a small but growing body of feminist analysis that links militarism and environmental issues. It explores the work of community organizations in the Philippines, South Korea, and Okinawa (Japan) as they seek solutions to severe long-term environmental and health problems caused by U.S. military operations. Victims and advocates want meaningful investigation and research; compensation for poor health, injury, and loss of life; firm environmental guidelines; and conscientious clean-up and restoration of contaminated lands and water. Their experiences tell a great deal about military practices and militarism as a system of power, values, and culture that creates many forms of insecurity.[3] This is not a comprehensive survey. I consider a few paradigmatic examples of Asian communities' efforts to deal with the environmental "fall-out" of routine U.S. military activities to illuminate a discussion of military security. These cases do not involve the devastation of outright war. They are significant precisely because they illustrate the everyday workings of the military in "peacetime." Indeed, peacetime has become what James Der Derian calls "the interwar," the time between wars that is part of the wars (2001: 25). Since President George Bush's declaration of an

open-ended "war on terrorism," this notion of "interwar" is more explicit and unapologetic, with preemptive attack now an overt part of U.S. policy. In addition to the countries that are the focus of this essay, other parts of the Asia-Pacific region, including Guam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and even Vietnam, have been drawn into supporting U.S. dominance as the United States seeks to control shipping in the Malacca Straits, realigns its forces and moves troops among established bases, and negotiates new access agreements for additional ports and airfields in the region.

Complex Inequalities: Gender, Race, Class, and Nation

Feminist philosopher Val Plumwood (1993) points to dualistic thinking as the logic underpinning hierarchical systems such as colonialism, racism, sexism, militarism, and environmental destruction. All rely on the creation of "otherness"—enemies—and inferiority to justify superiority and domination. These dualisms are mutually reinforcing and should be viewed as an interlocking set. Militarism has been a tool of colonialism and imperialism for centuries and is a key element in neocolonialism and the streamlining of the corporate economy as a global system. In turn, militarism deploys and exploits intersecting inequalities based on gender, race/ethnicity, class, and nation. These systems of inequality and oppression do not completely overlap, but constitute a "matrix of oppression and resistance" (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2004: 4). Contradictions and inconsistencies offer crucial opportunities for opposition. Such efforts can create instabilities that force change or generate more overt repression. In the accounts that follow, I note the ways that these inequalities are utilized in military policies and practices and point to contradictions among them. Later, I consider how community activists and advocates have attempted to use these inconsistencies to advantage, both to press for change and to put forward new understandings of security.

Setting the Context

U.S. economic and military interests have long played a key role in the Asia-Pacific region (Gerson and Birchard 1991). In the late nineteenth century, with a severe economic depression at home, U.S. manufacturers were eager to open trade with China. Given the technology of the time, trade required coaling stations for steamships. The U.S.

annexation of Hawai'i and the defeat of Spain and subsequent colonization of the Philippines provided strategic ports, spaced like stepping-stones across the Pacific. Even after Philippine independence in 1946, the U.S. military retained a 100-year lease for bases, including Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, the largest U.S. bases outside the United States. Successive U.S. governments supported pro-U.S. presidential candidates in the Philippines, most notably Ferdinand Marcos, who introduced martial law in 1972 to suppress the pro-democracy movement. This movement succeeded in ousting Marcos in 1986 and influencing the Philippine Senate to cancel the U.S. base agreement five years later. The U.S. Navy and Air Force left, but began to negotiate a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) almost immediately. Ratified in 1999, the VFA allows for U.S. military access to twenty-two ports on all the main islands for refueling, repairs, and R&R—far greater access than before and without the expense of maintaining permanent bases. Joint maneuvers, named Balikatan ("shoulder to shoulder"), between U.S. Marines and Philippine troops resumed the same year for the purpose of "combined training, combat readiness and interoperability" (Macatuno and Orejas 2004).

U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea date from the end of World War II. The last land battle raged over Okinawa for three months in the spring of 1945. The southern part of the main island was reduced to rubble, and some 200,000 people (approximately 30 percent of the population) died. The postwar U.S. military administration held Okinawan people in camps while it appropriated land for bases. The United States occupied Japan for six years but maintained its military administration of Okinawa until 1972. Okinawa, the poorest, southernmost Japanese prefecture and formerly an island kingdom with its own language and culture, is less than 1 percent of the land area but "hosts" 75 percent of the U.S. military in Japan on thirty-seven bases and installations. A three-tier relationship involves the Okinawa prefecture, the Japanese government, and the United States. In September 1996, 89 percent of Okinawans voted for base reduction in a local referendum, which, while not legally binding, was a significant indicator of public opinion

In South Korea, U.S. troops were hailed as "liberators" in 1945, ending thirty-five years of brutal Japanese colonization. At the end of World War II, the country was formally divided into the Republic of Korea, with U.S. support, in the south and the

People's Democratic Republic of Korea, with support from the USSR, in the north. The Korean War (1950–1953) started in response to provocative border skirmishes by both sides. North Korean troops crossed the border in an attempt to take over the South and reunite the country. The war caused great destruction of land and left four million people dead and many thousands missing, wounded, homeless or exiled (Toland 1991). With South Korean and U.N. forces, the U.S. reversed this attack, but the fear of future invasion has been a cornerstone of U.S. military policy to this day.[4] U.S. governments contributed to the economic rebuilding of South Korea and, as in the Philippines, supported, through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, antidemocratic governments that benefited U.S.-based corporations seeking low-waged labor. The United States is currently restructuring and consolidating its bases in South Korea, closing older ones north of Seoul and taking productive farmland to expand others to the south,

In the United States there are mechanisms and procedures, however slow and labyrinthine, for evaluating environmental quality and determining necessary remediation when bases are returned to civilian control. Outside the United States, however, procedures vary depending on the context. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), negotiated separately with each government, detail terms for U.S. military activities abroad and illustrate the unequal relationships between the U.S. and Asian governments (Kirk and Francis 2000).[5] SOFA negotiations are affected by the intensity of U.S. desire for access and the relative bargaining power of the "host" nation.[6] Despite significant inequalities among these three Asian countries—the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan—and despite rhetoric to the contrary, none of them negotiates with the United States as an equal partner. As allies, all depend on the United States militarily, politically, or economically, and view their national security as intertwined with that of the United States. Both Japanese and South Korean governments contribute considerable sums towards the upkeep of U.S. bases in their countries. Successive Japanese governments have supported the U.S. military presence as securing "stability" in the region. Former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung said he would want the U.S. military to stay on even after reunification. The Philippines relies on the United States for economic aid and hardware for its own military and seeks favorable loan conditions from the World Bank and IMF where U.S. interests predominate. These alliances mostly benefit male business

and political élites and contribute to antidemocratic political cultures and practices. The receiving governments' obligation is to ensure that the U.S. military can operate unimpeded. To this end, Asian governments ignore, diffuse, manipulate, or repress complaints and opposition from their own citizens, a point to which I return later.

The SOFAs with Asian governments treat the environment as expendable. Article 4 of the SOFA with Japan, negotiated in 1951, explicitly exempts clean-up of environmental contamination due to U.S. military use, stating:

> The United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas to Japan on the expiration of this Agreement or at an earlier date, to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which there were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration. (quoted in Grunder 1999, Appendix IX, p. 7)

The SOFA with South Korea and the earlier base agreement with the Philippines have similar exemptions.

There was much less consciousness about environmental issues when these SOFAs were first negotiated. But even with contemporary awareness and concern, the United States has managed to evade attempts to include environmental remediation in recent agreements. Some Philippine elected officials, including Senator Juan Flavier, a member of the Philippine Senate Committee on the Environment, urged their government to make the VFA conditional on the United States taking responsibility for clean-up of contamination caused before 1991. However, political maneuvering within the Philippine government blocked this demand. A Philippine House committee report held "the United States responsible, morally if not legally, for the trail of toxic wastes in the former U.S. military bases at Clark and Subic" but was not released until after the Philippine Senate had ratified the VFA. The VFA makes no mention of environmental damage or clean-up, past or future (Lee-Brago 1999). In South Korea, environmental groups, human rights organizations, and anti-bases activists lobbied hard for substantial changes to the U.S.-Korea SOFA when it was reviewed in 2001. The revised SOFA has, as an addendum, a memorandum concerning environmental standards and the sharing of information by U.S. military authorities in the case of accidents, but this provision relies on voluntary cooperation, and there are no sanctions for default (Green Korea 2001).

In contrast with these agreements, the NATO SOFA (for example, with Germany) is much more detailed and includes some environmental provisions.[7] Former U.S. bases in several NATO countries have undergone environmental remediation before being returned to civilian control. These European countries have stronger environmental laws than do the Asian countries under discussion, and they have insisted that the U.S. military comply with them. There is also a clear element of environmental racism in this double standard.

Despite the "client" status of Asian governments in relation to the United States, U.S. military officials and representatives of receiving governments bond around masculinity as exemplified by the arrangements made for militarized prostitution, apparently based on shared understandings of male sexuality as assertive and needing regular release (Enloe 1993; Moon 1997; Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 1992; Takazato 2000). This connection around gender is complicated by conflicting national or cultural identities. Occasionally, such contradictions surface publicly, as happened when an internal e-mail sent to members of his command by Lt. Gen. Earl B. Hailston, commander of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa, was circulated widely.[8] In it Hailston called the governor and other elected Okinawan officials "nuts and a bunch of wimps" in response to the unanimous passage by the prefecture Assembly of a resolution calling for a reduction in the number of Marines stationed in Okinawa.[9] This e-mail impugning the governor's masculinity, and the fact that it became public knowledge, humiliated and angered Governor Keiichi Inamine, who had promised a more "moderate" stance toward the U.S. military compared with former Governor Masahide Ota. Inamine was Tokyo's candidate for governor and had toed the Tokyo line. The e-mail incident, involving the intertwining of masculinity and Okinawan self-determination, pushed Inamine to take a harder line, which is detailed below, against U.S. military officials and Japanese authorities in negotiations concerning the relocation of the Marine base.

Environmental Effects of U.S. Military Bases and Operations in East Asia

The environmental effects of U.S. military operations in these three countries include severe noise from helicopters and planes taking off and landing; traffic accidents; soil erosion; fires; and chemical contamination of land, water, and the ocean from fuels, oils,

solvents, heavy metals, and depleted uranium. Land used for bombing training is pulverized to dust and rubble. Unexploded ammunition and debris litter bombing ranges and live-fire artillery ranges, as well as parts of the seabed. South Korea hosts major training exercises with the United States, Korean, and other militaries that extend over wide areas and damage crops and agricultural land. In line with hierarchical thinking, as Plumwood (1993) notes, when pressed by the U.S. military to provide land that can be burned, bombed, or contaminated as part of military operations, receiving governments choose disadvantaged and marginalized communities.[10]

Soil and Water Contamination: Former Clark Air Base, Philippines

In June 1991, the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo (Central Luzon) covered a wide area with a thick layer of volcanic ash. More than 20,000 families were forced to evacuate their homes, farms, and gardens. The Philippine government provided temporary housing in the Clark Air Base Command (CABCOM) area, recently vacated by the U.S. Air Force. These families moved into the very basic housing and shared makeshift facilities such as emergency toilets and wells. About 7,000 families lived in tents. Almost immediately people noticed that the well water was greasy with "a funny smell or an oily sheen" (Institute for Policy Studies 2000: 43). They had skin irritations after washing or bathing. As time passed, women experienced a high number of miscarriages and stillbirths, and children were born with central nervous system problems. Some families were moved to neighboring communities; others stayed on, awaiting rehousing. These families had lost their homes and livelihood as farmers and were therefore dependent on government support.

The Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition began to document the illnesses of these people, which particularly affected women and children. The Coalition helped to start the People's Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC) and worked with scientists and advocates from the United States who analyzed soil and water samples and found clear signs of serious contamination. Advocates and victims turned to church leaders, NGOs, academics, and elected officials for help. They took the story to the media. They turned up a January 1992 U.S. General Accounting Office report that noted environmental contamination of "superfund" proportions at Subic and Clark.[11] They lobbied the Clark

Development Corporation and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, charged with the redevelopment of the former base lands. Contamination was the last thing the authorities wanted to hear about, for they were courting investors from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to turn the old military buildings into garment factories, duty-free shopping areas, and tourist resorts with yacht clubs, golf courses, and casinos.

Media reports and public pressure pushed the development corporations to commission technical research from U.S.-based environmental consulting firms. A study undertaken by Weston International at Clark found heavy metals (mercury and lead), pesticides (dieldrin and malathion), and solvents (including benzene and tuolene) in water samples, and PCBs, pesticides, and JP–4 jet fuel in soil samples (Institute for Policy Studies 2000: 41). Many of the chemicals identified at Clark have been linked to an array of health problems including testicular and breast cancer, liver damage, spontaneous abortions with maternal exposure during pregnancy, and increased likelihood of central nervous system, heart, and urinary tract abnormalities (Olib 2000: 87–91). A second report, by Woodward-Clyde International (cited in Institute for Policy Studies 2000: 42), estimated that remediation of sites examined at the former Subic Bay Naval Base would cost $7–10 million, with another $1.4 million for further study.[12] In response, the development authorities sealed off specific sites, finally admitting the existence of contamination.

Local people continued to experience health problems, but they could not prove that their illnesses were caused by U.S. military operations. Long-term epidemiological studies with appropriate controls are needed to establish causal relationships, but these are time-consuming and expensive. In 1994, the PTFBC approached Dr. Rosalie Bertell, then with the Canadian-based International Institute for Concern for Public Health, who agreed to undertake exploratory research. She designed and analyzed a basic health survey of 761 households in 13 communities inside and around Clark Air Base. Results showed conspicuously high levels of kidney, urinary, nervous system, and female reproductive health problems (Bertell 1998). Examples included tremors, cramps, spasms, frequent dizziness, frequent painful urination, and irregular menstruation. In addition, the weight and height of older children were abnormally low, despite adequate

nutrition. Respiratory problems in children were high (24–31 percent) in all communities surveyed.

It gradually became clear that the U.S. military in the Philippines had not followed its own, admittedly weak, guidelines on the disposal and storage of fuels, oils, and solvents used for fueling, ship repair, aircraft servicing, armored vehicle repair, and ammunition assembly and transfer. They had not kept full records of their activities; they left Clark hurriedly when the base agreement was terminated; and they provided very little information to the Philippine government. CABCOM was the site of a former motor pool where these substances had been used, spilled, and thrown away. Ret. Adm. Eugene Carroll Jr., former commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS *Midway*, confirmed military contamination at Subic Bay, now the site of a significant cluster of leukemia cases, when he addressed the grassroots International Forum on U.S. Military Toxics and Bases Clean-up in Manila, November 1996:

> I can recall as commanding officer of an aircraft carrier in 1970, being closely monitored in U.S. ports to insure proper control and disposal of waste material. This increased caution was not evident to me here in Subic Bay in 1971 where ships, our aircraft and our industrial facilities were spewing polluted materials into the air, water, and soil with no regard for the short term or long term effects. (People's Task Force 1997: 18)

In its discussions on whether to renew the base agreement with the United States in 1991, the Philippine Senate had emphasized sovereignty, self-determination, and national pride. By contrast, environmental issues were significant during debates on the VFA a few years later, in light of the new information about military contamination. Senator Flavier and others tried to use the opportunity presented by the VFA negotiations to press the U.S. military to clean up environmental contamination at Clark and Subic, as mentioned above. In 1999, Senator Loren Legarda voted against the VFA, largely on environmental grounds.[13] In 2000, the Philippine government finally closed CABCOM, after the Department of Health confirmed the presence of heavy metals in the water and in vegetables grown there (Orejas 2004).

Activist research and organizing efforts broke through the silence regarding military contamination, which became the subject of at least thirty resolutions in the

Philippine House and Senate, including one urging President Joseph Estrada to take up the matter with President Bill Clinton.[14] However, President Gloria Mapacalang Arroyo was quick to pledge support for the Bush administration's "war on terrorism." She was rewarded with an official invitation to Washington and many millions of dollars in military and economic aid. She has chosen not to take up the issue of U.S. responsibility for the long-term legacy of environmental contamination, despite growing evidence of sickness, disability, and deaths in the affected communities.

Noise: Kuni Bombing Range, South Korea

The former Kuni Bombing Range is situated fifty miles southwest of Seoul. There are ten small villages nearby; Maehyangri, the nearest, is only a mile away. The bombing range was used by the U.S. Air Force for over fifty years, from the end of the Korean War to 2005. Pilots flew low and fast over green farmland, their targets two small islands just off the coast.[15] Unexploded ordnance and debris accumulated around the islands, on the beaches, and in the fields. Local farmers required official passes to enter the range to tend their crops when bombing training was not going on. Again, this is a disadvantaged, marginalized community. Villagers made a meager living through farming, fishing, and harvesting shellfish. The shellfish are probably contaminated, but members of Maehyangri Explosives Damage Citizens' Countermeasures Association have said that local people do not want them tested. If the shellfish are known to be contaminated, they will not be able to sell them, which would add to their economic hardship.[16]

In recent wars. U.S. bomber crews' precision, often described as "bombing on a dime" or "making a surgical incision," has been widely touted by the military and echoed by news reporters to stimulate patriotism and defuse criticism about civilian casualties. Flying over the Kuni range at 500mph to learn this skill, the difference between hitting the target or dropping a "misfired bomb" was a matter of split-second timing. Accidents were inevitable. Over the years, eleven Maehyangri residents were killed and others injured due to misfired bombs (Green Korea 2000). Doctors from the Council of Physicians for the Humanitarian Practice of Medicine found that the residents have high levels of deafness, dizziness, insomnia, and stress (Kim 2000). Ordinary arguments easily escalate to physical violence; depression is common; and thirty-two people have

committed suicide.[17] Children are easily startled and have difficulty concentrating. In the local school district, 80 percent of the “troublemakers” are from Maehyangri. Women have suffered high rates of miscarriage. Domestic animals were also affected by the noise and vibration. Cows gave little milk and often aborted their calves. The roofs of people’s houses have collapsed and walls have cracked due to severe vibration. In 2000, the U.S. military admitted that they had used depleted uranium at the Kuni range (Talbot 2000). In May that year, a U.S. A–10 fighter jet with engine trouble dropped six 500lb bombs on the range to lighten its load, an incident that prompted major protests and demonstrations at Maehyangri and near the U.S. embassy and the U.S. military command in Seoul (Associated Press 2000b; Baker 2000) . Three national organizations based in Seoul—Green Korea United, the Coalition of Korean Environmental Organizations, and the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea—are working on these issues, though with limited resources as military contamination is only part of their work.

Noise and stress are also factors for residents of villages at the foot of Taebek Mountain, a second bombing area, although these villages are not as close as those at Maehyangri.[18] This mountain provides an additional challenge for training. The bombing range is hidden in deep terrain, visible only from the mountaintop. Continuous bombing training has denuded one side of the mountain of all vegetation and destroyed wildlife habitat. Less visible is the cultural damage Korean people suffer, for this mountain is the site of Korean creation stories, and people continue to hold ceremonies there to venerate their ancestors.

Concern for the environmental effects of U.S. military operations is closely intertwined with anti-bases activism. The onus was on advocates and residents to prove conclusively that poor health or damaged houses were caused by the bombing. The military did not have to prove conclusively that their operations were not dangerous. South Korean authorities consistently supported the U.S. military against citizens of Maehyangri who had been demanding that the bombing range be closed since the 1960s. The government ignored these demands. Instead, they offered to relocate the residents, who rejected this option on the argument that this is *their* land, *their* home place where their ancestors have lived and died. In August 2000, in response to the protests mentioned

above, the South Korean government and U.S. military announced that they would close part of the bombing range “in an effort to ease friction with villagers” (Associated Press 2000b). In 2001, fourteen Maehyangri residents won a lawsuit that gave them a total of $100,000 in compensation from the South Korean government for damage suffered as a result of strafing exercises at the Kuni range (Korean Federation 2001). In August 2005 the Kuni range was finally closed, though the U.S. military has transferred its bombing training to another location in South Korea.

Fires, Destruction of Forests, Unexploded Ordnance, Depleted Uranium: Okinawa (Japan)

Okinawa is an archipelago, midway between Tokyo and Manila. Twenty percent of the main island, 40 percent of the air space, and large areas of the sea are under U.S. military control. As in the Philippines and South Korea, communities in Okinawa also experience contamination of soil, water, and the ocean due to military operations. Noise is also a major pollutant, causing serious annoyance to local residents, hearing loss, and disrupted classes in nearby schools. Like residents at Maehyangri, Okinawan citizens have chosen not to relocate these schools. To do so, they feel, would legitimize U.S. military operations and concede the struggle against them. An Okinawa prefecture study (1998) shows that babies born to women living near Kadena Air Force Base have significantly lower birth weights than those in other parts of Japan and attributes this to the noise generated by the base. At Kadena, pilots are trained in night flying, and planes are allowed to take off and land at any time. Another finding shows comparatively high rates of leukemia in children and cancers in adults near the White Beach Naval Station, a docking area for nuclear-powered submarines.[19] After losing the use of Subic Bay Naval Base during the 1990s, the Navy brought submarines into White Beach more often than before (People’s Task Force 1997: 39).

Visiting the United States in February 1996 to address U.S. audiences about the social and environmental costs of U.S. bases and military operations, Okinawan women described fires and accidents from live-ammunition drills.[20] The military used to shoot live ammunition across Highway 104, targeted toward Mt. Onna, near the west coast of the main island. In 1989, citizens of Onna village organized to stop live-fire drills on the

mountain, the source of their water supply, and to oppose construction of a new urban warfare training facility for the U.S. Army Special Forces (Onna Village Committee 1992). Reluctantly, for over forty years, they had tolerated regular live-fire drills without protest, although this had caused numerous fires. The dry summer of 1988, together with repeated live-fire drills, led to more forest fires and further soil erosion, decreasing the soil's ability to hold water and leading to faster run-off and subsequent water shortages. Increasing quantities of iron-rich red earth ended up in the ocean where it destroyed edible seaweed and contaminated the beautiful coastal park, a protected area. Onna residents are well aware of the priceless value of their ecosystem.[21] The army's decision to construct an urban warfare training facility was the last straw. Women and men from many village organizations held meetings and circulated petitions. They organized a round-the-clock surveillance system and blockaded the entrance to the military-controlled land, obstructing U.S. military vehicles from May through October 1989. Their concerted opposition forced military authorities to stop the live-fire drills and to seek an alternative site for the urban warfare training facility.

Another concern for Okinawan people is depleted uranium. The first known instances of its use occurred in December 1995 and January 1996 when U.S. Marines fired depleted uranium during shelling exercises at the Torishima U.S. Military Firing Range, a small island west of the main island. The U.S. military defines this as a conventional weapon, although it is a radioactive by-product generated by the uranium-enrichment process that isolates the isotope used for nuclear weapons and reactors. Depleted uranium weapons burn on impact, and much of their mass vaporizes and diffuses into the air as uranium oxide particles. If "ingested or inhaled, the combination of radiation and high chemical toxicity can cause cancer and a wide variety of other ailments" (Tashiro 2001: 12). Officially the U.S. military is not allowed to fire depleted uranium in Japan, but as this example illustrates, military authorities have flagrantly broken this agreement. These incidents became public a year after they happened. Okinawan people demanded that the U.S. military retrieve the spent rounds and inform local officials about their operations in future, but activists doubt that the agreement is working effectively.[22]

Some members of the Okinawa Prefecture Assembly, prefecture employees, local mayors, labor union members, and organizers have participated in official delegations to the United States to learn about procedures for base closure and clean-up here. With the Philippine experience in mind, advocates in the San Francisco Bay area advised Okinawan officials that “you get the clean-up you negotiate” and urged them to make strenuous demands for clean-up before land is returned to them.[23] As in the Philippines, there is little systematic information regarding military contamination available to local people. As a contribution to public education and debate, Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, a group formed after the rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen in September 1995, published a small pamphlet entitled “Chronology of Environmental Incidents,” compiled from information provided by base workers, local residents, and newspaper reports (Okinawa Women 1998). A sampling of incidents from 1947 to 1998 includes the deaths of eight people from Ie village in May 1947 due to arsenic poisoning, members of the U.S. Marine Corps having dumped chemicals into their well. In October 1967, wells in Kadena village caught fire due to contamination. In January 1968, large leaks of aircraft fuel from Futenma Marine Corps Air Station polluted drinking water and agricultural fields in Isa, Ginowan City. In April 1976, cleaning agents used to detoxify aircraft and embalming fluids used on corpses brought back from the Vietnam War produced severe pollution. Aircraft returning to Okinawa from Vietnam were contaminated with many chemicals including Agent Orange, and so on. Okinawan environmentalists working on this issue have hosted international meetings on military activities and environmental justice to establish an international network with participants from Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States.

In 1999, in response to the 1996 referendum and protests against the U.S. military presence, and under the rubric of “relieving the suffering of Okinawa,” Japanese government and U.S. military officials agreed to move live-fire training to four sites in mainland Japan.[24] This “compromise” extends environmental damage and militarization to additional areas and does nothing to reduce the number, or negative effects, of troops currently stationed in Okinawa. Okinawan citizens also deeply regret that the authorities have used their protests against other communities in this way. In 1996 the U.S. military

agreed to vacate 20 percent of the land it occupies, including the Futenma Marine Air Corps Station, on condition that the Japanese government provide and pay for a state-of-the-art floating heliport off the coast at Henoko, northern Okinawa. Grassroots groups, elected officials, and former Governor Ota all vigorously opposed the heliport, despite the fact that it could provide some jobs in an area of high unemployment. Japanese and international environmental organizations also expressed concern to protect the coral reef and the habitat of the Okinawan manatee (*dugong*), an endangered species. In 2001, after extensive opposition, Governor Inamine and local mayors finally accepted the new heliport proposal on condition that it is used for fifteen years only. Okinawan people, including many elders, held daily nonviolent protests on the beach starting in April 2004. In September 2004 they also took to the sea in kayaks and small boats to occupy offshore platforms erected to carry out test drilling in preparation for construction. After a year of concerted opposition, the Japanese authorities removed the drilling platforms, a victory for the protesters. However, in October 2005 the U.S. and Japanese governments announced a new plan to construct a runway, extending from the coastline at Camp Schwab, near site of the proposed heliport site.

A Window to a Larger Problem: Military Imperatives

Organizers involved with the Peoples' Task Force for Bases Cleanup described toxic contamination at Clark Air Base as "a window to a larger problem." It allowed them to see core elements, priorities, and nonnegotiables of militarism as a system of values, policies, and practices (Institute for Policy Studies 2000: 41). Three key imperatives anchor militarism:

Readiness

The military's mission and absolute priority at all times is "readiness" for war, an imperative that takes on even greater urgency in wartime. Ret. Adm. Eugene Carroll described the pressure of the "intense pace of operations" at Subic Bay during the Vietnam War, for example, when

> environmental issues were completely ignored in the rush to meet operational commitments. . . . Cutting, welding, sand blasting, corrosion control, paint

> stripping, painting and tank flushing both of ship and aircraft, went on around the clock and the debris was simply flushed into the ground and the bay (People's Task Force 1997:18).

Readiness is a slippery concept, much bigger than war, and an inexhaustible source of legitimation for expanding militarism. Base commanders may allocate funds for on-base environmental clean-up, but these must come out of their operating budgets and thus compete with readiness.

Secrecy

The mandate for secrecy requires that local officials and residents remain ignorant of events inside the fences sealing off military bases from outsiders. Consequently, local officials have to expend much time and effort trying to find out what has happened to land used by the military and keep track of military activities and future plans so as to be able to make plans for their municipalities. Okinawa set up the Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (DFAB) as a liaison with U.S. military officials. The following examples, among numerous press reports, illustrate the problems for local communities. In 1995, the U.S. military returned the Onna Communications Site used by the Marines from 1953 to 1982. Mercury, cadmium, and PCBs were found in a waste-water treatment facility left on site. Village authorities asked the DFAB to ask the U.S. military "how the hazardous materials happened to be on the site" as a way of finding out what other problems they might have to deal with (*Okinawa Times* 1998). Three years later, no progress had been made on clean-up, and the land remained off-limits. In January 2002, construction workers in Chatan dug up leaking drums, apparently containing tar and oil, on the site of a former firing range that had been returned to public use twenty years before (*Okinawa Times* 2002). Chatan officials were faced with identifying the contents, tracing the extent of the leaks, and undertaking clean-up. The governor agreed to request related documents from the U.S. military through the DFAB.

Immunity from Control

A third imperative is immunity from political and legal control of environmental pollution. Militaries create much more contamination than industrial operations, but are

governed by fewer regulations, monitoring programs, and controls (Seager 1993b). In the Philippines, South Korea, and Okinawa (Japan), immunity from environmental control is provided through the SOFAs. Within the United States, the Department of Defense (DOD) is, as a federal agency, subject to federal law, though environmental protections may be waived on a case-by-case basis if the DOD shows that compliance would harm military readiness and national security. The President may also permit the DOD to override environmental law. DOD efforts to reduce environmental oversight are significant, however, even though they do not apply to the Asia-Pacific region (with the exception of Hawai‘i) because they signal a trend toward greater environmental irresponsibility.[25]

Organizing Strategies and Frameworks

Organizers in all three Asian countries I have discussed have used a range of methods to increase public awareness and concern and to press governments for compensation and environmental restoration:

1. Establishing a base of knowledge by documenting contamination and effects on health.
2. Making this issue visible through public events, rallies, demonstrations, and lobbying.
3. Creating informational materials for public education and media work.
4. Providing services in affected communities.
5. Networking with civic and environmental organizations, and across regional and national boundaries.
6. Filing lawsuits.
7. Demanding re-negotiation of the SOFAs to provide environmental safeguards.
8. Articulating visions of a genuinely secure and sustainable future.

As mentioned earlier, the organizing efforts I have discussed here draw on a matrix of oppression and resistance, based on intersecting identities and inequalities of race, class, gender, and nation. In all three countries, national or cultural identifications are strong. In the Philippines, the pro-democracy movement of the 1970s and 1980s lives on in a range of organizations drawing on a mix of human rights, feminist, nationalist, or Marxist frameworks. In Okinawa, people draw on their sense of Okinawan identity, defined against “mainland Japan” and often invoking Okinawa’s earlier independence, to

sustain opposition to U.S. bases and Tokyo-centered policies that have designated Okinawa the major U.S. military zone in Japan. In South Korean anti-bases organizing, anti-Americanism, and Korean nationalism are important factors, especially among younger activists. As in the Philippines, a concerted pro-democracy movement in South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s has had some success in changing an extremely repressive political culture. One result of these efforts is that younger activists feel more entitled to speak out against U.S. military policy, and, by implication, South Korean government policy. These national and cultural identities are also intertwined with those of class, race/ethnicity, and gender.

A crucial strategy in breaking through the secrecy and silence concerning military pollution has been to establish a base of knowledge. In the Philippines, students and faculty at the University of the Philippines and from the United States undertook exploratory research to establish the existence of contamination. Overwhelmingly, those with this technical expertise are college-educated men who have appropriate skills, access to labs, and the knowledge necessary to analyze and critique technical reports from government, military, or environmental research organizations. Their reports and credentials have been essential. These reports also make for dry reading, as they are full of chemical names, statistics, and the alphabet soup of regulatory agencies. The subsequent day-to-day public education and political work has been largely undertaken by women in affected communities, PTFBC staff and interns, and other women activists who have translated technical arguments into accessible language with a focus on “real life” stories of people struggling with illness and tragedy (Olib 2000). This division of labor follows conventional gender lines.

Key women from outside the affected communities also played a role in the research and education process. Dr. Rosalie Bertell lent her expertise to the problem when few professionals with her international reputation were willing to get involved. Philippine Senator Loren Legarda used her position to appeal to U.S. legislators and made environmental concerns an important issue in the Philippine Senate debate on the VFA. Judge Aurora Recina, chair of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights, took the issue to the U.N. Human Rights Convention in Geneva, using the Stockholm Declaration on Intergenerational Equity, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child,

and the Rio Declaration to argue for children's right to a safe and healthy life (Torres 1999). Gen Vaughan of the Foundation for a Compassionate Society (Austin, Texas) provided financial support (Baldonado 2000). Young Filipino-American women worked as PTFBC interns. Later they were pivotal in founding Filipino/Americans for Environmental Solutions (FACES; www.facessolutions.net), a U.S. group whose members utilize their dual identities as U.S. citizens with Filipino heritage. Women are very active in this group. Also, women have been actively involved in providing services for affected communities. In the Philippines mothers and community volunteers have carried the burden of caring for those who are sick. Nurses conducted the health survey and support families with sick children.[26]

This combination of scientific, educational, political, and community work has been very successful in opening up public debate and action on an issue that had been officially presumed foreclosed. The plight of the affected families, particularly children born with disabilities like cerebral palsy that prevent them from walking or talking, made tragic news. Crizel Jane Valencia, conceived and born in CABCOM, who died from leukemia at age six, on February 25, 2000, became a symbol of this intractable problem. Her joyful spirit was an inspiration to all who met her; her drawings have been shown in the Philippines and the United States in an exhibit entitled "Crizel's World: Butterflies and Benzene."

Organizers in Okinawa and South Korea have learned a great deal from the Philippine experience. In the Japanese context, Kaori Sunagawa (1999) has identified major difficulties for bases clean-up. These include a lack of sustained citizen participation, no legal framework for clean-up, no clear demarcation of responsibility, no participation of the U.S. military in planning for clean-up, and no demand for information from the U.S. military by the Japanese government. Without a forceful, active citizens' movement, she notes, these other limitations are unlikely to be addressed. Communities in South Korea face similar difficulties (Kim 2000).[27]

Gender is a fundamental element in this problem. The deleterious effects of toxic contamination tend to show up first in women and children (Gibbs 1998; Kettel 1996; Nelson 1989; Seager 1993a). In addition, gender-based daily activities that may confine women to the home and immediate neighborhood expose them "to environmental illness

in a gender-differentiated manner" (Kettel 1996: 1368). Thus, Okinawan women living near Kadena AFB who do not work outside the home may be much more susceptible to ongoing stress from aircraft noise compared with their husbands, who leave the house for a workplace elsewhere. Fetal development is a complex process that is highly sensitive to toxicities and stressors (Steingraber 2001). A woman's compromised health due to contaminated water or severe noise and stress means that she cannot provide a safe bodily environment for her fetus. She may miscarry or give birth to a stillborn child or to a child with congenital health problems and disabilities. Further, if the main source of water is contaminated, she cannot care for her family adequately or keep them clean and healthy. This can exacerbate stress and feelings of anger, depression, and powerlessness.

Women's embodied knowledge of environmental contamination is thus both personal and social. By contrast, the initial work of researching the existence of contamination is technical and scientific. The difference has led to a gendered division of labor among activists that can be disempowering for women. Two gender-based strategies could make it less so: technical training for women and an analysis of military contamination linked to reproductive health. In the first case women would be trained to take soil and water samples as part of the exploratory research. They could claim technical expertise and "authority," and they would demystify basic environmental science for other women.[28] On the second point, framing military pollution as a reproductive health issue could mobilize a wider cross-section of the population and make possible stronger connections with major women's organizations and feminist activists for whom the right to reproductive health is a strong claim. Aida Santos has argued that this linkage would be politically effective and culturally appropriate in the Philippines, where general discussion has not yet linked environmental contamination and reproductive health.[29] While both of these strategies are promising, they move in different directions. Training women to do scientific research could break down gender hierarchy. An emphasis on women's reproductive health as present or future mothers reinforces gendered divisions and runs the risk of essentializing women.[30] This is an important tension in feminist activism generally and raises fundamental questions of analysis, strategy, efficacy, and consistency between means and ends.

Another contradiction between means and ends is militant antimilitarism based on nationalist and masculinist values and culture, as exemplified by the Maehyangri Explosives Damage Citizens' Countermeasures Association in South Korea. This group was successful in getting national and international attention for their situation, a key factor that led to the closing of the Kuni bombing range. The male leadership mobilized students, workers, and human rights activists to participate in major demonstrations and confrontations, where some attempted to climb over the fence of the bombing range, for example, and to pull the fence down. Their members were beaten up by riot police and served time in jail. Man Kyu Chun, the Association chair, used sexualized imagery in comments about the rape of Korea by U.S. troops, and in comparing the land of Maehyangri to a woman's breasts.[31] Maehyangri women supported the male leaders by providing for their families and cooking food for demonstrators. Nationalism provides an empowering framework, given the neocolonial relationships between South Korea and the United States. However, a nationalist perspective flattens out internal inequalities based on gender, race/ethnicity, and class, and movements operating out of nationalist frameworks may reproduce some of the same dualisms as obtain in the wider society. The gendered nature of nationalist discourses often produces negative consequences for women. Women activists are marginalized within the South Korean peace movement. As well as opposing the U.S. military, these women also seek to transform the militarized perspectives and organizing strategies within the nation's male-dominated peace movement.[32] Along similar lines, Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence does not work with Marxist organizations that tend to be male-dominated and doctrinaire.

Networking across national boundaries has linked U.S. and Philippine activists, for example, through the U.S. Working Group for Philippines Bases Cleanup and Filipino/Americans for Environmental Solutions (FACES). U.S.-based organizations like the former Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace (Washington, DC) and the Institute for Policy Studies (Washington, DC), informal groups such as Friends of the Filipino People (Boston) and Okinawa Peace Networks (San Francisco and Los Angeles), as well as Asian American organizations, church groups, and human rights activists have all played a part in transnational organizing. At the International Grassroots Summit on Military Base Cleanup in Washington, DC, September 1999, organizers from Asia,

Europe, South America, and the Caribbean shared information and strategies concerning U.S. military contamination and adopted a Host Country Bill of Rights that defined clean-up standards that should apply to all U.S. bases irrespective of location. The Host Country Bill of Rights also includes two internationally recognized principles: the "polluter pays" principle and the precautionary principle that advocates precautionary measures even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically (Montague 1998: 1).

Organizers in the Philippines and the United States have also pursued legal channels in their efforts to get the United States to take responsibility for toxic wastes in the Philippines. On December 3, 2002, a coalition of Filipino nationals, FACES, and ArcEcology filed suit in federal court in San Jose, California, on behalf of thirty-six residents from communities around the former Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. The lawsuit sought to enforce provisions of U.S. environmental law that require the federal government to investigate contamination resulting from its activities. This is the first time residents of another nation have used this law to sue the U.S. government. Although unsuccessful, this suit may open the way for further legal action.

Activists who are working on the issue of military contamination know that their governments do not want to strain relationships with the United States. At the same time, these governments do not want to stimulate stronger opposition to the U.S. military by neglecting local people's concerns and anger. U.S. military authorities and receiving governments may be forced to make concessions in their efforts to balance these competing claims, for example, by moving live-fire drills from Okinawa to sites in Japan, or closing the Kuni bombing range. Dealing with local opposition and resistance is the job of the host governments. In cases of environmental accidents or reports of environmental illness, they typically attempt to minimize the problem by assuring people that everything is quite safe. In Okinawa, under Governor Ota, however, the prefecture undertook its own research into the issue of low-birth-weight babies born near Kadena AFB. People living near this base have won compensation for noise pollution through lawsuits against the Japanese government (*Japan Times* 1998). But SOFA (Article 3) precludes the Japanese government or the courts from banning night flights or restricting

"the management and operation of an airport of the U.S. military and its activities" (ibid.).

The U.S. military also contributes to managing local opinion by hiring workers, contributing to local causes, and hosting barbecues and open days, replete with displays of military hardware, on the Fourth of July or other major holidays. At times, U.S. military officials offer derisory, pro forma apologies for some egregious military action that has generated sufficiently strong opposition. For example, in July 2000, Lt. Gen. Daniel J. Petrosky, commander of the 8th U.S. Army in South Korea, apologized for an incident in which U.S. military personnel had dumped formaldehyde into the Han River, a main source of Seoul's drinking water (Associated Press 2000a). On April 30, 2002, U.S. Forces Okinawa Area Coordinator Lt. Gen. Wallace Gregson held a press conference to apologize for a recent series of military accidents, including a fuel tank that dropped from a helicopter at Futenma and a fuel leak from a C2 transport jet (*Ryukyu Shimpo* 2002). Though perhaps embarrassing at the moment, these apologies are easy to make and do not change policies and practices.

Redefining Security

In all three countries, activists have created public awareness and debate about the environmental and health effects of routine peacetime military operations. They have challenged dominant narratives that take for granted the need for political and military alliances with the United States and the so-called "protection" of military security. They have opened up a space to talk critically about the heavy social, economic, political, and environmental costs of militarism. Evidence from the communities discussed here suggests that framing the issue in terms of reproductive health could be useful in speaking to women's experiences and mobilizing more women at an earlier stage. The maternalist emphasis on women as mothers and nurturers accommodates women's traditional roles and would expose a fundamental contradiction: government support for U.S. military operations has seriously obstructed women's work of caring for their families and has made them ill. A maternalist approach may make it difficult for governments to ignore women's claims even though these same governments invoke

patriotism, anticommunism, or fear of other countries to silence criticism of U.S. military activities.

In official discourse, national security is equated with military security, which places militarism at the center of public policy, justifies vast military expenditures, and naturalizes military activities in people's consciousness. Compared with "war talk," Ferguson and Turnbull (1999) see national security discourse as rational and bureaucratic and hence more difficult to challenge. At the same time, Seager notes that national security "is a vague and constantly shifting concept—it has no real or absolute meaning; it is whatever the military defines it to be (with the agreement of other men in the national security loop)" (1993b: 38). The experiences and insights of activists in the Philippines, South Korea, and Okinawa (Japan) illustrate fundamental contradictions between environmental security and military security, and contribute to shared understandings about the need to redefine the concept of security to include human and environmental health, as well as redistributive justice. Many draw on the UNDP's foundational principles for human security: that

- the environment can sustain human and natural life;
- people's basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education are met;
- people's fundamental human dignity and respect for cultural identities are honored;
- people and the natural environment are protected from avoidable harm.

Asian activists know through direct experience that militarism has undermined or even destroyed their everyday security. Their experiences of environmental destruction entailed in preparations for war show the interconnections among systems of inequality and domination based on gender, race/ethnicity, class, nation that are utilized and reinforced by militarism. Their work constitutes a thorough-going critique of these hierarchical systems and the realist state-centered paradigm of international security based on militarism. Local community organizations working for solutions to the severe long-term environmental and health effects of U.S. military operations in these three countries focus on the details of specific, everyday problems. At the same time, their analyses and international connections allow them to see the imperatives and global reach of U.S. military power.

Notes

This essay is part of a larger project that I have been working on for several years, both individually and in collaboration with others. Sources include meetings and discussions with activists and researchers who participate in the East Asia-U.S.-Puerto Rico Women's Network, as well as interviews, unpublished reports, informal conversations, and e-mail communications. I am greatly indebted to those who have provided translations of documents or given their time and skills to interpret conversations and discussions. I am also grateful for the support of a Rockefeller Fellowship that allowed me time to work on writing this chapter.

[1] For further analysis of environmental destruction during war, see S. Bloom et al. (1994); Center for Defense Information (1999); Committee for the Compilation of Materials (1981); Gough (1986); Lifton (1967); Seager (1992); Shenon (2000).

[2] For a discussion of uranium mining, see Eichstaedt (1994). For analyses of the development of nuclear power and nuclear weapons, see Bertell (1983, 1985); Birks and Erlich (1989); Caldicott (1994); Shulman (1990, 1992). For assessment of nuclear weapons tests, see Ball (1986); Ishtar (1994, 1998); Dibblin (1990). For analysis of disposal of radioactive waste, see Christensen (1988); Kemp (1992). For discussion of depleted uranium, see Tashiro (2001).

[3] Other ways that militarism undermines everyday security, especially for women, include military violence against women and related civilian cultures of violence, as well as budget trade-offs that lead to disinvestment in socially useful programs and services while military spending is high.

[4] North and South Korea are still technically at war as no peace treaty has been signed between them, although they are exploring steps toward unification. Many South Koreans have condemned President Bush's characterization of North Korea as part of "the axis of evil" because they believe it exacerbates this sensitive situation.

[5] Their comparative length in English gives a crude measure of their relative scope: the Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines is 7 pages; Status of Forces Agreements with Japan and with South Korea take up 49 pages; but with NATO countries the agreements have more than 300 pages.

[6] The DOD uses the term "host" nation, language which suggests the U.S. military is located in Asian countries by invitation, as a visitor, whereas many communities deeply resent the presence of these bases alongside them.

[7] Since 2001, the U.S. military has established new bases in Eastern Europe as part of "the war on terrorism." SOFAs with Bulgaria and Romania, for example, allow lower environmental standards compared with the SOFA with Germany.

[8] The e-mail was circulated by the Boston Okinawa Committee with the subject line: "Action against U.S Military Outrages against Japanese and Okinawans," (March 2, 2001).

[9] Okinawan leaders introduced this resolution in response to public outrage at the sexual molestation of a teenage girl by a U.S. Marine on January 9, 2001—just one in a long list of incidents of rape and sexual assault committed by U.S. troops against Okinawan women and girls (Okinawa Women 1998).

[10] Military operations also provide clear examples of environmental racism and classism within the United States. Nuclear technology has done disproportionate damage in rural and blue-collar communities like Fernauld, Ohio; Hanford, Washington; Rocky Flats, Colorado; and Savannah River, South Carolina. Radioactive waste from uranium mining is scattered on Navajo land and at the Laguna Pueblo, New Mexico. The military appropriated Western Shoshone land for the Nevada Test Site, and the Department of Energy plans to use Western Shoshone land for a high-level radioactive waste dump at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Depleted uranium weapons are tested at Socorro, New Mexico.

[11] If located in the United States, these places would have been considered among the nation's worst hazardous waste sites and would have qualified for funding from the government Superfund, created in 1980 to stimulate clean-up of extremely contaminated areas.

[12] These sums are beyond the reach of the Philippine government but small when compared with the U.S. military budget for FY 2005—$440 billion, excluding the cost of invading and rebuilding Iraq.

[13] E-mail circulated by PTFBC with the subject line: "VFA and Toxics Issue" (August 5, 1999). Senator Legarda wrote to Senator John Chafee, then head of the U.S. Senate Environmental Committee, urging him to press for clean-up. He forwarded her letter to the Department of Defense for a "detailed response." Instead, she received the standard reply: the United States has no legal responsibility for clean-up of former bases in the Philippines and the federal budget makes no provision for bases that have been closed (Institute for Policy Studies 1997: 46).

[14] In 2000, U.S. Congressman Robert Underwood of Guam introduced the first House Resolution on military contamination in the Philippines, with thirteen co-sponsors from both parties. Although the resolution did not pass, optimistic supporters saw it as a step forward. Madeline Albright promised to send a research team to investigate but this did not happen. As of 2007 no progress has been made.

[15] There used to be three islands; one has been completely destroyed, and another is much reduced in size.

[16] Mr. Chun, Chairman of Maehyangri Explosives Damage Citizens' Countermeasures Association (Maehyangri, July 30, 2001) interpreted by Don Mee Choi.

[17] Interview with Yu Jin Jeong and Dong Shim Kim of the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea (Oakland, November 14, 2001), interpreted by Helen Kim.

[18] Interview with Dong Shim Kim of the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea (Oakland, November 14, 2000). She joined activists from Green Korea United to investigate this bombing range. They counted from 250 to 300 planes a day, flying so low they could see the pilots' faces.

[19] In 1998, for example, two women, who had been in the habit of gathering shellfish and seaweed in the White Beach area, died of liver cancer.

[20] A thirteen-woman delegation, the Okinawa America Women's Peace Caravan, made presentations in the San Francisco Bay area, New York, Washington, DC, and Honolulu.

[21] Their ancestors had protected the forest by forbidding the cutting of live trees without permission. As a result, during the three-month-long Battle of Okinawa at the end of World War II, "the lives of almost all the citizens who evacuated and hid out in the

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forests they had so carefully nurtured and protected were spared" (Onna Village Committee 1992, ii).

[22] Interview with Suzuyo Takazato, Co-chair, Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence and elected member of the Naha City Council (New York, February 19, 1999).

[23] Personal communication, Saul Bloom, Executive Director, ArcEcology, San Francisco.

[24] These are Yausubetsu, Hokkaido; Yufuín, Kyushu; and Kita-Fuji and Higashi-Fuji, near Mt Fuji.

[25] In March 2002, the DoD argued before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Readiness for exemptions from laws concerning critical habitat for threatened and endangered species, migratory birds, marine mammals, range management and restoration, and state plans for air quality. House and Senate Committees, the General Accounting Office, and former EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman all disputed Pentagon claims that this legislation jeopardizes training and impedes military readiness. In March 2003, however, Republicans attached a similar measure to the DoD 2004 budget authorization bill, citing the imminent war with Iraq and ongoing "war on terrorism" as justification for blanket exemptions (Deardorff 2003). As a result, DoD does not have to comply with legislation protecting endangered species, migratory birds, or marine mammals. It is seeking exemptions from the Clean Air Act and from two toxic waste laws, which could have far-reaching effects on human health (Shogren 2004).

[26] Philippine country report to Okinawa International Women's Summit: Redefining Security (Naha City, Okinawa, June 22–26, 2000) presented by Marisa Navidad on behalf of PTFBC.

[27] Japan and South Korea have bodies of environmental law dating back to the 1960s and 1970s respectively (Kato 1996) that do not include military contamination. Environmental movements have mainly responded to the devastating effects of high-speed industrial growth (Lee and So 1999).

[28] A U.S. literature documents women's organizing against environmental hazards after they or their children become ill: Gibbs (1995, 1998); Glazer and Glazer (1998); Kaplan (1997); Krauss (1993); Pardo (1990); Zeff, Love, and Stults (1989). Women from white working-class communities and communities of color have taken on governmental

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agencies and corporations responsible for contamination, especially from toxic waste dumps and incinerators, despite being ridiculed by officials, industry "experts," and news reporters as "hysterical housewives." Nelson (1989) honors their research as kitchen-table science. This organizing has often been framed in terms of environmental justice, with less emphasis on its gender dimensions.

[29] Environmental Working Group discussion, East Asia-U.S. Women's Network Against Militarism, second international meeting, Washington, DC (October 11, 1998).

[30] See De Alwis (1997) for a discussion of Sri Lankan mothers' protests that draw on traditional gender roles.

[31] Interview with Dong Shim Kim (Oakland, October 14, 2001) interpreted by Helen Kim.

[32] Interview with Dong Shim Kim.

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