

Genuine Security for Women: My Sister's Place at Twenty

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I first heard about My Sister's Place at a packed meeting in Philadelphia in the spring of 1989. Yu Bok Nim, co-founder and former Director, spoke about the situation of women working in bars and clubs or living with US servicemen alongside military bases in Korea. She was part of an international group of activists who participated in a US speaking tour entitled "Voices of Hope and Anger: Women Speak Out for Sovereignty and Self-Determination". My Sister's Place was then just three years old—a brave, pioneering effort that broke taboos in Korean society and offered friendship, counseling, and practical help to women who many considered the lowest of the low.

The Wider Context: Globalization of the Economy

In those days the women who worked in these bars and clubs were Korean. Some had been victims of sexual abuse as children or teens. Many were the oldest daughters in their families who took responsibility to provide for their younger siblings or their aging parents. Often a family crisis like the need to pay school fees or medical bills was what pushed them to work in *kijichon* areas. Nowadays, the national health system and government supports to elderly people are stronger than in the past. And as the Korean economy has expanded many women now have other opportunities to make a living, although women's earnings, on average, are still 60 % of men's earnings.

Currently, women from the Philippines, a chronically impoverished nation, account for around 80 % of women working in the special clubs near US bases. The Philippines is a predominantly agrarian country where nearly half the population subsists on less than the equivalent of \$2 per day. Government policies encourage women and men to seek work overseas. In 2004, contract workers remitted more than \$7 billion in official transfers, though the Asian Development Bank estimated a much higher amount (\$14-21 billion, or 32% of GNP and more than foreign investment and foreign aid combined).ⁱⁱ In 2005, an estimated 9 million Philippine people were working abroad, roughly 10 % of the population. They officially remitted \$10.7 billion or 12 % of GNP. President Gloria Mapacalang Arroyo has described overseas workers as "the backbone of the new global workforce" and "our greatest export".ⁱⁱⁱ This overseas employment strategy brings in hard currency such as US dollars or Japanese yen, and offers an outlet for the growing population that the Philippine economy does not provide.^{iv}

The Philippine government seeks to play both supportive and regulatory roles throughout the labor migration process. This begins with securing access to foreign labor markets.^v The government makes temporary labor migration a foreign policy issue in bilateral and regional trade negotiations. This is an employment-driven strategy. Securing the rights of its citizens to settle permanently abroad has never been a priority for the government. Host countries that have specific labor shortages but that discourage permanent immigration have been particularly good partners in this.

At the same time that the Philippine government seeks to open access to foreign labor markets, it also tries to prevent its citizens from using unregulated channels to migrate. In order to leave the country to work, Filipinos must be recruited by either a licensed recruiter or a government agency, or must have their contract approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and enroll in the official benefits program. The government prohibits its citizens from overstaying a visa and maintains a list of workers banned from future contracts, as part of its efforts to market Filipinos abroad as high-quality migrant labor.

Factors that push Philippine women to work abroad include low wages, high unemployment rates, and the absence of sustained economic development at home. Most overseas contract workers do domestic work or work as entertainers. Republic Action No. 8042, known as the Magna Charta of Migrant Workers, articulates the rights of women workers to protection and security, but they face several problems. These include illegal recruitment, high placement fees, contract substitution, non-payment of wages, delayed remittance, poor working conditions, racism, alienation, prejudice and discrimination. Women migrant workers are also “vulnerable to maltreatment and abuse, sexual harassment and social and moral degradation.”^{vi}

Other women working around US bases in Korea come from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the USSR created political, economic, and social challenges and hardships in all the former socialist republics, with disproportionate declines in women's status and wellbeing. Women working in Korea come from Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which have experienced economic and social crises in their transition from centrally planned to market economies.

In Russia, for example, the state can no longer guarantee employment or provide health care and pension benefits that citizens were accustomed to during the Soviet era. Negative social effects of economic hardship are prevalent. Alcoholism, drug abuse, pornography, and prostitution are all at much higher levels than before the break-up of the Soviet system. Women have been hardest hit by the unstable conditions. They experience higher levels of unemployment and poverty compared to men, and are also victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking.^{vii}

In Uzbekistan, the growth of women's unemployment in the state sector has been offset to some extent by rising employment in the informal economy and in agriculture. Women are increasingly concentrated in such low-wage sectors of the workforce and receive lower wages than men for the same work.^{viii} According to a report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, women are trafficked from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, Israel, Albania, and Western Europe.^{ix} Kazakhstan is considered a source, transit, and destination country for traffickers, and several provisions of its Criminal Code address components of trafficking.

In her video essay, *Remotely Sensed*, Swiss researcher Ursula Biemann shows the flows of women crisscrossing the globe along ever-changing routes and trajectories shaped by economic hardship, cultures and laws that provide for men's sexual lives, and the immigration policies of receiving countries. She portrays the "movement of women in cross-border circuits, illegal and illicit networks as well as alternative circuits of survival".^x She argues that women enter these migration circuits for many reasons and with varying expectations. They may feel that agents who recruit them are providing a valuable service in helping them to achieve their desire to move to a richer country. The migrating women appear as data streams in the video, scans and X-rays portrayed over landscapes passing by. Their anatomical and demographic data are recorded, their routes appear in electronic travel schedules on the screen. They are the embodiment of the abstract financial flows that feed the global economy.^{xi}

The Wider Context: Militarism

Women's accounts of how they came to *kijichon* areas and their working conditions in the bars and clubs often feature agents who misled them, managers who keep them under close watch, and club owners who are only interested in making money. These people define the women's daily realities. But their work is organized within a wider political and military context, which includes the relationship between the US and ROK governments, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) officials negotiate to govern US military conduct in South Korea, as well as Pentagon policies and regulations. US military and Korean government officials have long agreed that soldiers need access to women. This shared understanding is not often spoken but has been the subject of explicit arrangements to ensure the availability of women in *kijichon* areas, as described by political scientist Katharine Moon.^{xii} The military and political alliance between the two governments is subject to ongoing negotiation. Officials do not come to these discussions as partners on an equal footing in terms of national power and resources, but they bond around patriarchal assumptions. Cynthia Enloe, a feminist scholar of international relations, emphasizes male officials' shared assumptions about soldiers' sexuality.^{xiii} They make a distinction between so-called "bad women" who are to be available to US servicemen, and "good women" who are to be protected from the predatory sexuality attributed to military men. Racist and sexist assumptions about Asian women—as exotic, accommodating, and sexually compliant—are an integral part of military prostitution, held by individual soldiers and at the institutional level. It is this framework that makes militarized prostitution different from other sectors of the sex industry.

From a US military perspective, South Korea is still considered a war zone and a "hardship" posting, as no formal peace treaty has been signed between North and South Korea. Typically, most US service members based here are young; their tours of duty are short; and the military prefers them unencumbered by family members. They are usually posted to Korea following basic training, often en route to Iraq or Afghanistan. For the military, the *kijichon* areas function as safety valves where soldiers can "let off steam" in specific locations, released from the pressures of constant training, and from stress, boredom and homesickness. US servicemen have privilege, as men and as buyers, in their encounters with women working in the bars and clubs, whether these are one-night

stands, casual liaisons, or longer-term live-in relationships. They are also privileged by their US citizenship and are protected from many infringements of Korean law under the SOFA provisions. In terms of class, their situation may be analogous to that of the bar women who are also part of a “poverty draft.” But this does not necessarily translate into sympathy or respect. Often the very opposite is true, as US soldiers, notably white men, have committed atrocious crimes of violence against *kijichon* women. In such cases, a sense of superiority based on racism, sexism, and nationality is more powerful than parallels based on class.

Entertainers, Migration, and Anti-trafficking Laws

In the mid-1990s, the Korean government loosened the migration process for foreign entertainers. The Korea Special Tourist Association—made up of *kijichon* club owners—began to bring in women from the Philippines and CIS countries on entertainer visas. In the beginning, most Philippine women came from Metro Manila, or Pampanga in Central Luzon, but now recruiting agencies are active in more isolated areas like Mindanao. To qualify for an E-6 entertainer visa, a woman has to train and be certified as a singer or dancer and she expects to work as a singer or dancer in Korean clubs.^{xiv}

Indeed, one of the few ways that these women can enter South Korea to work is as entertainers. The Korean government has control over their movements through visas, fines for overstaying the permitted time period, and deportation orders. Regarding visas, the government may “turn off the tap” in response to various influences and pressures. For example, Korean NGOs have exposed the exploitation of foreign women working in *kijichon* bars and clubs. Reports of human rights violations alerted Korean society to this situation so the government stopped issuing E-6 visas for dancers from CIS countries in 2003. More women from the Philippines soon filled their places. However, women from CIS countries were issued E-6 visas as singers.

The Korean government has passed two laws that affect the sex industry: the 2004 Act on the Punishment of Procuring Prostitution and Associated Acts, and the 2004 Act on the Prevention of Prostitution and Protection of its Victims. The first calls for sanctions for trafficking and procuring prostitution. The second establishes assistance facilities and counseling centers with social, legal and medical support for victims. Under this new legislation, victims of prostitution are defined as persons who are subject to various forms of coercion to sell sex, including drugs and debt. Victims of prostitution are not subject to punishment but are eligible for assistance and counseling.^{xv} These laws do not address military prostitution though they state that foreign women who can demonstrate that they are victims of sex trade are eligible for the same kind of protections and services as Korean women.

In the past few years, several US official directives have addressed trafficking and prostitution. In 2003, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 22, which sets out a “zero-tolerance” policy with respect to US government employees and contractor personnel stationed abroad who engage in trafficking in persons. In January

2004, the Department of Defense issued a memorandum restating its opposition to “prostitution and any related activities that may contribute to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons as inherently harmful and dehumanizing.” On October 14, 2005, President Bush signed Executive Order 13387, which makes “patronizing a prostitute” a violation of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.^{xvi}

The US military has started to educate soldiers on the issue of trafficking. If the military suspects that a *kijichon* club is involved in the sale of sexual services, the club is defined as “off-limits” for military personnel for a period of time. Equality Now, a New York-based women’s human rights organization, reports that in September 2004, “General LaPorte, the Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) testified before the Joint House Armed Services Committee as to their efforts in administering ‘a zero tolerance approach to prostitution and human trafficking.’ According to General LaPorte, since January 2003, USFK had ordered disciplinary action of five servicemen for soliciting (or patronizing) prostitution, and prosecuted 398 servicemen for related offenses such as violating curfew and trespassing in off-limit establishments.”^{xvii}

US troops still patronize bars and clubs in South Korea, and military prostitution continues. However, there is a trend these days for soldiers to prefer live-in relationships, mostly with women from the Philippines. The women choose to live with US soldiers rather than continue to be exploited in the special clubs. However, if they leave the clubs they lose both their work permit and their residence permit, which is tied to their job. As undocumented workers it is difficult for them to find other work and, if caught by immigration officials, they are fined and sent back to their country. They may get jobs in small factories that employ undocumented workers. They may engage in prostitution independently on the street, usually for low fees, or rely on US military boyfriends or husbands for their support. If a woman is in a relationship with a US soldier there is a built-in temptation to overstay her visa in order to be with him. She hopes the relationship will work out and lead to marriage and, ultimately, the chance to go to the United States.

Thus, the US military continues to exploit women’s economic vulnerability. In the case of the Philippines this has roots in US colonization, dating from 1898. Since Philippine independence after World War II, the US supported anti-democratic governments that maintained deep inequalities within Philippine society. Currently, the US plays a dominant role in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which influence economic development through loans to successive Philippine governments. Accordingly, US interests continue to be a strong influence on the direction of economic development in the Philippines, and partly explain why there are inadequate economic opportunities for many Filipino people.

US soldiers with live-in girlfriends are not, strictly speaking, engaging in prostitution or trafficking. This allows military officials to talk about zero tolerance while, at the same time, their troops have sexual servicing. US military authorities in South Korea exploit the ambiguous situation of migrant women. Some may, indeed, have been trafficked under the terms of Korean law. The fact that US military authorities apparently condone this situation leaves them open to the charge that they are complicit in the trafficking of women, despite pronouncements to the contrary.

Feminist Approaches to Women's Security

Feminist scholars and activists emphasize women's insecurity within nation-states and also in relation to the global economic system. They point to the fact that women's wages, on average, are invariably lower than men's. Transnational corporations and their subcontractors pit women workers in one country against those in another as they scramble to increase profits by speeding up production and lowering wages. Feminists also emphasize high government investment in militaries at the expense of healthcare, education, job training, and services for children and the elderly. They demand more effective policies and practices for dealing with violence against women, recognizing the links between cultures of violence generated by militarism and patriarchy.

Feminist Critiques of Dominant Approaches

Governments, military policy-makers, and most English-language scholarship in the field of international relations take the nation-state as the primary reference point in thinking about security. According to political scientist Ann Tickner, the predominant view assumes the world to be "a hostile international environment" in which "sovereign, self-interested states" seek their own security through a balance of political and military power among them.^{xviii} On this view, war is always a possibility and having a strong military is a central concern. Security = national security = military security. This perspective has dominated US political, military, and academic thinking about security for many decades. It provides the framework for college-level courses and texts, and is repeated in news reports, talk shows, and media interviews. As a result, many ordinary people in the United States—and perhaps in South Korea—also hold this view.

This narrow state-centered perspective does not provide for women's security:

- It assumes that significant conflict only happens between states. It also assumes that if the state is "secure" (that is, not at war) everyone living within its borders is also secure.
- Security is narrowly defined to include political and military factors, and the protection of state borders and values. It does not include people's economic security, food security, security from interpersonal or community violence, or the structural violence of poverty, sexism, or racism.
- It cannot address interconnections between politics and economics; it takes the economy as a given, not relevant for investigation.

The other dominant perspective focuses on global economic integration and the assumed strengths of a global market system, rather than the security concerns of individual states. This involves freedom for corporations to operate with few restraints; increased corporate access to markets; mobility of capital and labor; and the privatization of common goods, like water. This approach holds that economic expansion will benefit everyone, and that increased prosperity will "trickle down" from richer people and nations to poorer ones. This perspective informs government policy in most countries. It is taught in universities and provides the framework of mainstream news reporting on economic issues. But, again, this perspective does not provide for women's security. It is focused on corporate

rights and profits, not human needs. Moreover, the operations of transnational corporations are reinforcing inequalities between nations and within nations.

Feminist scholars of international relations reject both these mainstream approaches. Jill Steans argues for a people-centered view of security that recognizes “multiple sources of insecurity, which particular groups of people face according to their specific circumstances.”^{xxix} A people-centered approach would highlight “the equal importance of all people and their security needs regardless of race, class, gender, or formal political status.”^{xxx} It can also incorporate economic insecurities, gender-based violence, and the structural violence of racism and poverty.^{xxxi} Women must have the resources to provide for their own security, Ann Tickner argues, as relying on male “protection” reinforces gender hierarchies and is a major justification for militarism.^{xxii}

Demilitarizing Security

Everyday security has little to do with militarism. Indeed, so-called military security undermines and erodes everyday security in several ways:

- It diverts monetary, natural, and human resources from socially useful investment.
- It causes long-term environmental destruction and pollution with serious effects on human health.
- It creates and reinforces a culture of violence at personal, community, institutional/national, and global levels.
- It undermines participatory governance structures and processes.

Betty Reardon, a feminist peace educator and researcher, notes that there are no truly secure societies in the world, and none that are fully committed to achieving genuine human security.^{xxiii} And the military contributes relatively little on the positive side. The present militarized international security system is maintained at the expense of the natural environment, the economic and social needs of many people, fundamental human rights, and protection against ill health, accidents, and disasters.

Using National Laws and International Human Rights Frameworks

In advocating for genuine security for women, feminist scholars and organizers rely on relevant national laws and policies as well as international conventions and standards that support all aspects of women’s wellbeing. Much feminist work adopts a human rights framework, based on the United Nations Charter, which declares that states “are obliged to uphold and advance human rights”.^{xxiv} Some have argued that supposedly universal human rights are still defined in male terms, but they value a human rights approach that asserts women’s needs and circumstances. Feminists have made progress at national and international levels by using a human-rights approach to violence against women, for example, arguing that women’s rights are human rights and must be safeguarded as such.

International standards and resolutions provide several tools for promoting and evaluating women's everyday security. One is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, which provides an ongoing framework to lobby national governments to make changes in support of women's rights. Countries that have ratified or acceded to the Convention are legally bound to put its provisions into practice. They are also committed to submit national reports, at least every four years, on measures they have taken to comply with their treaty obligations. Although governments may be very slow in making progress towards these goals, these mechanisms give leverage to advocacy and lobbying efforts, and a wider context for government accountability.

The Beijing *Platform for Action*, the action agenda of the NGO Forum associated with the Fourth UN World Conference on Women held in China in 1995, outlined twelve main areas where governments should take steps to enhance women's lives and opportunities. They include changes in economic policies to undo the harms of structural adjustment programs; cuts in military spending in favor of social spending; provision for women's participation at all peace talks and in all decision-making affecting development and environment; tougher policies concerning violence against women; recognition of the significant contribution women make through unpaid work; and acceptance of diverse family forms.^{xxv}

Specifically relating to security, the 1994 UN Development Report introduced a people-centered approach that includes economic security, food, health, environmental security, personal, community and political security.^{xxvi} The report states that everyday security should include safety from chronic threats and protection from severe disruptions. This is a holistic approach and these aspects are inter-related, so that security on one dimension can be undermined by insecure conditions along other dimensions.

In 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325, the first to address the impacts of war and armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace building, and women's contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace.^{xxvii} This groundbreaking resolution makes women—and a gender perspective—relevant to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations, and reconstructing war-torn societies. Resolution 1325 calls for:

- participation of women in peace processes;
- gender training in peacekeeping operations;
- protection of women and girls and respect for their rights; and
- gender mainstreaming in the reporting and implementation systems of the United Nations relating to conflict, peace, and security.

Everyday Security for Kijichon Women

A lack of economic opportunity is the dominant factor that pushes women to work in *kijichon* areas. In narrow economic terms, young women may have higher earning capacity in the sex industry than in other kinds of employment, but this declines with age. In addition, *kijichon* women are at risk for violence, poor health, and economic exploitation. Those married to US soldiers are often very dependent within these relationships, and the men may leave when their tours of duty are over. Indeed, there has been a rise in cases of migrant women deserted by US soldiers in Korea in the past few

years. In Dongduchon, for example, a community of undocumented women helps and supports each other, while living in a legal limbo. ^{xxviii}

Elderly Korean women who used to work in the bars and clubs still live in *kijichon* areas. Now in their 60s and 70s, they were praised by past governments as dollar earners who took care of US troops. Typically, they are living in poverty, often struggling with poor health and social isolation. Other Korean women whose income depends on US troops work in restaurants or stores and are vulnerable to changes in military schedules and operations, including base restructuring and closures. Camp Stanley, next to My Sister's Place, is slated to close in the next few years. Some of the *kijichon* businesses have already closed and storeowners complain that business is slow. FOR RENT signs advertise many vacant rooms in the village. These women face crucial questions: What will happen to them when the base closes? And how they can sustain their livelihood?

Korean women's organizations, including My Sister's Place, have broken significant new ground in pressing the government to pass the anti-trafficking laws mentioned above. Some customers and club owners have been sued for infringing these laws, and sex industry sites have been closed down. In response, the industry is changing: moving locations and relying more on the internet, massage parlors, or the streets. US military directives mentioned above also focus on the buyers, on the "demand side" of this issue.

Strengthening women's everyday security will also require an increased focus on "the supply side": the impoverished circumstances that make women available to be trafficked. There is a need for rural and urban economic development in the Philippines, for example, that can support families and communities in a sustainable way. Women need economic independence and educational opportunities they can afford. They need reproductive freedom and freedom from violence. They need opportunities to develop their talents and fulfill their dreams, which may include opportunities to travel or to live outside marriage and conventional heterosexual norms without the coercion of poverty.

In August 2006, I met Faye Moon briefly in Seoul, formerly a missionary from the United States and co-founder of My Sister's Place. She talked about the importance of winning women's confidence in those early days when My Sister's Place occupied a small store front in the village. In the past 20 years My Sister's Place has done this. It has maintained a steady, reliable presence in the neighborhood. It has undertaken projects on women's health, counseling, computer training, art and crafts therapy, English language lessons, and education for mixed-race Amerasian children. It has helped women cope with difficult circumstances with dignity and self-respect. It has insisted that others respect them also.

As well as supporting *kijichon* women, successive groups of staff have also raised the issue of military prostitution in public consciousness. My Sister's Place has initiated video projects, and published data for NGOs and the academic community in Korea and internationally. These days, My Sister's Place is also involved in campaigns and policy work at the national level and in international networking concerning the trafficking of women. It joins in solidarity with Korean NGOs and with international peace movement groups that challenge patriarchal and militaristic assumptions, policies, and practices. My

Sister's Place has participated in an international women's network against militarism for the past decade.^{xxix} In addition, the organization has trained a whole generation of women advocates.

Military officials declare the end of a war. They urge rebuilding and a return to "business as usual." They exhort those involved to "move on". But war is not over so easily. It persists, maybe for decades, in physical and mental injuries, environmental destruction, betrayed trust, and broken hearts. Militarism is much bigger than war. It includes military values, cultures, operations, ideologies, and assumptions about security. Women working in *kijichon* areas in Korea are part of the everyday workings of the US military in "peace time": what James Der Derian calls "the interwar," the time between wars that is part of the wars.^{xxx}

From her years of experience as Director of My Sister's Place, Yu Young Nim sees the ways that militarism and military violence traumatize women.^{xxxi} She understands that healing takes courage, time, and patient support. It requires a place where women can gradually process their pain and generate renewed confidence and hope for their lives. My Sister's Place is one such location. Given the magnitude of militarism and the long-term residues of wars, there is a need for many more places to do this in Korea and throughout the world. My Sister's Place has much to teach others. It brings 20 years of experience to this ongoing and necessary work.

ⁱ I'm honored to be invited to contribute to this publication that marks the 20th anniversary of My Sister's Place in 2007. From my perch in the office alongside Camp Stanley during a 3-month stay in 2006, I developed a deeper understanding of the organization's history, challenges, and accomplishments. I look forward to learning more.

ⁱⁱ Wehrfritz G and Vitug M. 2004. Philippines: Workers of the World, *Newsweek*, October 4. Accessed on October 20, 2006 at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6100244/site/newsweek/

ⁱⁱⁱ Paddock, R.G. 2006. The Overseas Class. *Los Angeles Times*. April 20. Accessed on October 20, 2006 at www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-remit20apr20,0,3918689.story

^{iv} *ibid.*

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- ^v O'Neil, K. 2004. *Labor Export as Government Policy: The Case of the Philippines*. Migration Policy Institute. Accessed on October 20, 2006 at www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=191
- ^{vi} Republic of the Philippines. 2005. National Statistical Coordination Board. Accessed on October 18, 2006 at www.nscb.gov.ph/ru12
- ^{vii} Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Stop Violence against Women Project. Accessed on October 10, 2006 at www.stopvaw.org/Russian_Federation.html
- ^{viii} Human Rights Watch, *Background: Women and Uzbek Nationhood*. Accessed on October 10, 2006 at www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uzbekistan/Uzbek0701-01.htm#P191_32007
- ^{ix} Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Stop Violence against Women Project. Accessed on October 10, 2006 at www.stopvaw.org/Kazakhstan.html
- ^x Biemann, U. 2002. Remotely Sensed: A topography of the global sex trade. *Feminist Review*, vol. 70: 75-88. For images and text see www.geobodies.org/video/sensing/sensing.html
- ^{xi} *ibid.*
- ^{xii} Moon, K. 1997. *Sex Among Allies: Military prostitution in US-Korea relations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- ^{xiii} Enloe, C. 1990. *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making feminist sense of international politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Enloe, C. 1993. *The Morning After: Sexual politics at the end of the Cold War*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- ^{xiv} Kim, Dong Shim, Associate Director, My Sister's Place. Personal communication, October 1, 2006.
- ^{xv} Equality Now. Women's Action 23.2, March 2006. Accessed on October 20, 2006 at www.equalitynow.org/english/actions/action_2302_en.html
- ^{xvi} *ibid.*
- ^{xvii} *ibid.* "Further details are not known as the U.S. military has not responded to repeated inquiries from Equality Now."
- ^{xviii} Tickner, J. A. 1992. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 38.
- ^{xix} Steans, J. 1998. *Gender and International Relations: An introduction*. New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press. p. 126.
- ^{xx} *ibid.*
- ^{xxi} *ibid.* p. 127.
- ^{xxii} Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*. p.
- ^{xxiii} Reardon, B.A. 1999. Materials prepared for Gender and Human Security Group, Hague Appeal for Peace.
- ^{xxiv} Steans, *Gender and International Relations*, p. 122.

^{xxv} Morgan, R. 1996. Dispatch from Beijing. Ms magazine. January/February, p. 20.

^{xxvi} United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report, 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*. Accessed on October 31, 2006 at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/pdf/hdr_1994_ch2.pdf

^{xxvii} See, for example, UNIFEM. 2004. *Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*. New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women. Accessed on October 31, 2006 at www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/gettingitright.pdf

^{xxviii} Kim, D.S. 2006. Human Rights Situation of Foreign Women in the Korean Sex Industry. In *Out of the Trap, Hope One Step: Case studies of prostitution and sex trafficking in Korea*. Seoul: Dasi Hamkke Center, pp. 39-48.

^{xxix} The East Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women's Network against Militarism, founded in 1997, links grassroots activists and activist-scholars from Korea, Okinawa, mainland Japan, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, continental United States, and Hawai'i. Participants are drawn together by experiences of the negative effects of US military bases, operations, and budgets in their communities. They share experiences and strategize together to strengthen organizing work in these countries. The Network builds on the work of many others, including Faye Moon and Yu Bok Nim. Brenda Stoltzfus, Alma Bulawan and others co-founded the Buklod Center in Olongapo (Philippines). Philippine activists and researchers founded WEDPRO to propose alternative development plans for former US bases that would benefit local communities, especially women who had relied on the bases for their livelihood. Margo Okazawa-Rey interviewed Korean mothers of mixed-race Amerasian children, and initiated a speaking tour in the United States for two women who had helped her in this: Ahn Ilsoon and Kim Yeon Ja. Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, a group with roots in earlier feminist organizing, challenges the terms of the US-Japan Security Treaty.

^{xxx} Der Derian, J. 2001. *Virtuous War: Mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment network*. Boulder: Westview. p. 25.

^{xxxi} Personal conversations with the author, July-September 2006.